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Civil Rights and Mental Hospital
Administration
Ewing H. Crawfis*
L ET US START OUR DISCUSSION by indicating a frame of reference
for the comments we wish to give about civil rights. Our
discussion will relate primarily to patients, who have been hos-
pitalized for the observation and treatment of mental illness,
rather than those patients seen either in the office or in the clinic.
It is also based on the statutes in Ohio and on the practice in the
courts and more especially in the receiving hospitals and state
hospitals in Ohio. It should be noted that the state hospitals give
long-term care for such patients and that the receiving hospitals
give short term care for such patients. The receiving hospitals
admit a high percentage of voluntary patients, whereas the state
hospitals admit patients who have been committed. In the two
receiving hospitals in Cleveland, the percentage of voluntary ad-
missions exceeds fifty per cent, while the two state hospitals have
less than ten per cent of voluntary admissions.
In Ohio, there is a clear distinction between voluntary ad-
missions and medical certificate admissions, and all other types
from the standpoint of the patient's civil rights. Section 5123.57
of the Ohio Revised Code provides that all patients except volun-
tary and medical certificate admissions are incompetent. There
is one exception to this in that Section 5123.23 provides for a
ninety day referral by the Probate Court in questionable cases
where the Court cannot make a final determination as to whether
or not the patient is mentally ill. It is assumed that under the
provisions of this section of the statutes, the patient's competence
is suspended during this period of time until the final disposi-
tion by the court. There has been no court decision on this,
since it has been in effect only since November, 1959.
It is well for us to remember that even for the committed,
incompetent patient, certain so-called "natural" rights are re-
tained. I refer to such things as the right of privacy, the right
to be protected from assault, libel and slander, the right to sue
in tort for negligence (although the suit must be instituted in
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the patient's name, by someone else). The right to file an applica-
tion for a hearing under a Writ of Habeas Corpus is also retained.
The primary civil right, which is lost by commitment, is that
of freedom. As a psychiatrist, with long experience in the hospital
field, there are several comments I should like to make regard-
ing the commitment process and the loss of civil rights on a
general basis.
Lawyers and newspapers are much concerned about "rail-
roading" in which persons can be, and are wrongfully placed in
an institution by relatives or other persons. I can assure you
that it is the consensus of hospital psychiatrists that these oc-
currences are rare and are greatly over-emphasized. This is
particularly true in this modern day when the psychiatric hos-
pital has a social service staff to explore the social history and
to interview relatives and friends, than it was formerly when
the medical staff of the hospital was almost completely dependent
upon the information supplied by the court and by the com-
plaining witness. Our over-crowded state hospitals are not
anxious to hold anyone who can be released, and I would assure
you that our problem is much more frequently that of getting
the improved or recovered patient out of the hospital rather
than of holding an individual who is not sick. Such situations
occasionally can occur and some safeguards are needed, but I
do wish to point out that such safeguards should be held to a
minimum and should not be so burdensome as to restrict the
admission of the individual needing treatment. One of the re-
cent suggestions here in our city is to expand the investigative
function of the probate court in these cases, just as the proba-
tion department makes investigations for the criminal courts. It
is my belief that this is a wise suggestion and that those rare
situations where an injustice does occur might thus be prevented.
At the present time our probate courts must accept the affidavit
of the complaining witness, and where there is no information
to the contrary, must-of course, act on the basis of the infor-
mation provided. It is entirely possible under this situation that
where there has been a family quarrel or where the complain-
ing relative is quite paranoid, but is able to present a good ap-
pearance to the court officer, that an individual may be sent to
the hospital, who is not ill. The more common occurrence how-
ever, is with the individual who is senile and who has under-
gone some physical deterioration requiring hospitalization, but
in which either nursing home care or hospitalization in a general
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hospital is not feasible. In these instances, the family and every-
one concerned is so anxious to have the patient hospitalized that
the symptoms of mental illness are exaggerated to the point that
the court is led to believe that the patient is psychotic. Certainly,
in this second kind of a situation, the availability of appropriate
facilities will do more for the solution than will the efforts of
the hospital social service staff or the suggested investigative
branch of the probate court.
The second item I wish to comment upon is the traumatic
character of the legal procedures, and particularly the attitudes
of the police and the court personnel, which are so damaging
to the patient and frequently delay and impair the treatment
program. This is involved in the fact that our commitment pro-
cedure still parallels the procedures in criminal court in filing
of the affidavit, the holding of the hearing, and finally the trans-
portation of the patient (criminal) to the hospital by the police or
the sheriff. It is certainly in accordance with good legal principles
that a person, whose legal rights are being adjudicated, has a
right to appear and to defend himself; therefore the patient is
usually required to be present at the hearing. However, for
many patients, particularly the paranoid individuals, the testi-
mony of relatives or friends or physicians concerning his symp-
toms may only further convince him that he is being persecuted
and that everyone is against him. Thus, it is not surprising that
the patient comes to believe that the staff of the hospital are
participants in this plot, and for this reason he is unable and un-
willing to cooperate and to participate in the process of diagnosis
and treatment. Even though probate court personnel are sym-
pathetic, they must conform to legal requirements.
Finally, of course, is this question of the transportation of
the patient to the hospital in a patrol wagon, frequently in some
sort of restraint and accompanied by uniformed officers. It is a
common experience for the psychiatrist, as the admitting of-
ficer, to have the accompanying officer remove the restraints and
to find the patient to be entirely cooperative without the need
for shackles. Fortunately, this practice is not as prevalent as it
was a few years ago. Many of our patients come to the hospital
voluntarily or are brought in by their relatives. However, there
still is a fairly large number brought to us by the police depart-
ment or by the sheriff's department, and restraint of these patients
is only rarely necessary. I would hope that we would get to the
point where this kind of handling would only be regarded as an
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emergency, and that it would be dispensed with in all other
handling of the mentally ill by the police or the sheriff's depart-
ments.
For the past few years I have been quite vocal in my criti-
cism of the Ohio statutes in making commitment an automatic
adjudication of incompetence. Many of the other states have
divided the issues of competency and hospitalization, but Ohio,
unfortunately-has not seen fit to follow their example. In
actual practice, some of the probate judges in Ohio consider that
the hearing prescribed in Section 5123.23 is primarily to de-
termine competency, and that if the patient is found to be in-
competent then commitment follows automatically. There was a
time, in one of our county probate courts, when the court
psychiatrist regarded his examination of the patient as primarily
an effort to determine the question of need of hospitalization
without particular effort being made to establish diagnosis or
prognosis, and specifically with no effort being made to determine
competency. When he testified in the court that the patient
needed hospitalization and recommended commitment because of
this, the probate judge assumed that he was testifying that the
patient was incompetent. This situation existed for some months
before the court psychiatrist became aware of the judge's atti-
tude. This particular problem is aggravated by the statute which
governs the discharge from the hospital and its relation to the
restoration to competency-Section 5123.50. When the patient
is discharged as recovered, this operates as a restoration to com-
petency. When discharged as improved, it does not operate as a
restoration to competency. In addition to this, the discharge in
either category does not operate as a termination of his legal
guardianship, but it may be used as evidence in a hearing to
terminate guardianship. Unfortunately, in most instances the
medical staff of the hospital, in considering the discharge of the
patient and evaluating his condition at the time of discharge,
pays very little attention to the question of competency, and
thus may create a situation which is unjust to the discharged
patient. I will return to a further discussion of this problem, but
at this point I would like to comment on the question of the
psychiatrist's testimony before the court.
Professor Ross has suggested that the questions asked of the
psychiatrist and the testimony relating to the patient's condition
should be phrased in terms of social facts and predictions. I
feel that this is an excellent suggestion and that, if it were
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adopted, the physician's testimony would be much more mean-
ingful. The physician is trained to speak in terms of diagnoses
and prognoses and to the trained listener these terms are mean-
ingful. Unfortunately, to the untrained hearer they are not so
meaningful and, in fact, may be misinterpreted and misunder-
stood. The psychiatrist assumes that the court is thoroughly
familiar with these technical terms. It would be much better if
he would talk with the court in the same fashion as he explains
the patient's condition to the relatives-namely, in terms of
"what's wrong," "can the person be helped?", "what treatment
is needed?", and "how long will it take?" As psychiatrists we
need to avoid the pitfalls of using labels. They are frequently
not well understood, even by our colleagues, and the risk is
much greater with other persons. Let me point out several of
the interpretations which I have found to be fairly common in
dealing with lawyers and courts:
1-The diagnosis of psychoses and neuroses. The common
impression is that the neuroses are mild and do not require hos-
pitalization, while psychoses are severe and do require hospitali-
zation. While this generalization is true, it is not inherent in the
diagnoses and does not necessarily follow in every case. They
are two separate categories of disorders and each individual
patient must be considered on the basis of the problem involved.
There are certain neurotics who are best handled by hospitaliza-
tion, just as there are fairly large numbers of psychotics who
can be handled without hospitalization.
2-The qualifying phrases "acute" and "chronic." Many lay
persons react to these terms by assuming that the patient can
be handled at home or in the psychiatric unit of a general hospital
in the case of "acute illness," whereas it is assumed that hospitali-
zation in a state hospital is required in chronic cases. While the
type of onset and the duration of illness are factors in making
the determination, the primary criteria used relates to the re-
versibility of pathology. If it appears, for example, that the
brain will return to its normal state, the diagnosis of the illness
may be classified as acute, even though it may be several weeks,
or even months, in duration. On the other hand, if it is clear that
there will be permanent damage, the illness will be classified as
chronic, even though only a few days have elapsed since the
illness became apparent. Under ordinary circumstances, of
course, illness starts as an acute illness and then, after permanent
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damage occurs, is classified as chronic as soon as the acute
symptoms subside. However, the important point is not whether
permanent damage has occurred, but that we need to determine
the degree of damage and the level at which the patient can
operate. There are many mild, chronic psychotics who show
permanent irreversible pathology, but who do not require hos-
pitalization and who are able to function in society, even though
on a limited basis. This leads me to point out that the qualifying
phrases-mild, moderate, and severe-are frequently much more
meaningful in evaluating the need for hospitalization than
whether the diagnosis is neurosis or psychosis, or whether it is
acute or chronic. Further than this, such phrases are much
better understood by the lay person.
From the above discussion, I think that it is clear that the
testimony concerning the commitment would be much clearer
to the court if the questions were not "Is the patient psychotic?",
or "Is his illness chronic?", or "Is he competent or incompetent?",
but rather, "Is this individual ill?" and if so, "What is the severity
of his illness?". In predicting his future behavior, what should
be recommended?
Now, let me return to my discussion of the discharge process
and point out where our own usage of words from a medical
standpoint rather than a legal standpoint produces injustice: Sec-
tion 5123:50 states that a discharge as recovered operates as a
restoration to competency; a discharge as improved (anything
less than recovery) does not so operate. The statute equates re-
covery and competence, improvement with incompetence. In the
medical usage of the term "recovered" this is taken to mean that
the patient is able to return to the previous level of function
before the illness. Our manual (the A. P. A. Manual) by which
we code our discharges, for example, says that we should
evaluate the patient in terms of his condition and the level of
function before he entered the hospital. Now in two hypothetical
cases, how does this work out?
I-Mr. A, a very responsible business man, in an executive
position, has a cerebral accident (stroke) and because of
his confusion and other symptoms, he is committed to X
State Hospital. After three months, he has improved re-
markably, is able to leave the hospital and return to his
job and perform adequately, although his employer says
he still has difficulty in finding words and phrases to ex-
press himself properly and he still has a mild, residual,
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one-sided paralysis. Because of this, he cannot be classi-
fied as recovered, but only as improved, so that his com-
petency is not restored upon discharge, even though, in
fact, he can be considered competent.
2-Mr. B, a workman, who has always made a border-line
adjustment on his job and whose family says he has al-
ways been an isolated person, who made a poor social
adjustment, suddenly became upset at home and creates
a sufficient disturbance so that he is committed to the
same state hospital. After three months he too is able to
leave the hospital, go back to his home and return to
work. His family says that he is much the same as he
was prior to his hospitalization except that he no longer
resents his parents' advice to him as to how to handle his
pay-check and his expenditures. The hospital staff feels
that in all likelihood, he was a chronic schizophrene be-
fore he was hospitalized, and that he has returned to his
former mild state and is able to make a border-line social
and economic adjustment. Because of this, since he had
attained such a level, he is classified as recovered, and
this discharge operates to restore him to competency, even
though he probably was not competent before being
hospitalized.
In my opinion, the only way this sort of situation can be
limited and controlled is to completely separate the issues of
hospitalization and competency. The determination of com-
petency should be a legal problem and it should not be de-
termined by the medical staff, nor should it be linked to either
the question of hospitalization or discharge.
Let us now turn to a discussion of the patients' rights while
he is within the hospital. Many states have statutes on the quali-
fied privileges of correspondence and visitation. There are only
two states which give the patient an absolute statutory privilege
of writing to anyone without censorship. As a matter of general
policy, our hospitals in Ohio permit correspondence and visiting,
and the restrictions on these privileges are individually applied
only when it has been demonstrated that such correspondence
or visiting are harmful to the health and welfare of the patient.
As an example, the patients in our hospital send and receive
their mail uncensored. Other hospitals do censor both incoming
and outgoing mail, but the patients can send and receive it. Visit-
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ing is permitted on certain hours and certain days, with the
regulations designed primarily to control traffic and to avoid in-
terference with normal treatment activities rather than any ef-
fort to restrict visiting. It should be pointed out that the patient's
physician, attorney or minister is permitted to visit the patient
at any time, and these three classes are not restricted to specific
visiting hours. Exceptions to the regular visiting hours are also
made for relatives or friends who come from a considerable dis-
tance and who could not conveniently visit during regular visit-
ing hours. Section 5123.03 provides the basis for this policy by
stating that patients may freely correspond with their relatives,
friends, physicians and regular legal advisors, and that they may
also receive visits from them except when that is termed inad-
visable by the Superintendent (medical staff), and in such in-
stances the Superintendent shall place on file, subject to inspec-
tion, a written assignment of the reason for not permitting such
correspondence, writing or visits. The same section says that the
patient's personal or family physician shall be admitted at all
times.
After a patient has been observed in our hospital for several
days, the majority of them are permitted the privilege of using
the telephone at specifically designated times. It should be
pointed out that this is not customary in other hospitals and that
this example is cited to illustrate that the elaborate restrictions
formerly thought necessary for mental patients are needed only
occasionally. Because of the relatively small number of patients
and the more intensive treatment program at this hospital, such
a practice is feasible, whereas in some of the other hospitals,
with a much larger patient load and smaller staff, such a practice
might create administrative problems.
Ohio has no provisions in its statutes concerning the use of
restraints. Some other states do have such regulations, which
require that the patients who are in restraint must be reported,
that they must be seen by the staff at certain regular intervals,
and that the restraint is removed at certain intervals. With the
advent of the newer treatment methods, particularly the tran-
quilizing drugs, the need for such mechanical restraint has large-
ly disappeared. I would offer the opinion that statutory pro-
visions in this regard are unnecessary today.
Section 5123.03 also provides that before proceeding with
any major operation "the Superintendent shall notify the patient's
personal or family physician, spouse, parent, guardian or next of
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kin." Note that it does not state that consent is required. This
particular provision must be evaluated in connection with Sec-
tion 5123.43, which provides that the Superintendent shall have
exclusive custody and control of the person of the patient during
the time he is detained, whether or not a guardian has been ap-
pointed. The effect of this Section is to clothe the staff of the
hospital with authority equivalent to that of guardianship of the
person. Again, as a matter of policy, our hospital requests per-
mission for all types of treatment, including surgery. If permis-
sion is not obtained, then a decision must be reached as to
whether treatment will be given in spite of objection. This de-
cision is usually based on the patient's condition and the type
of treatment under consideration. For example, if consent was
refused for elective surgery, the surgery would not be per-
formed. However, if the patient is acutely ill and it is felt that
the treatment is strongly indicated, it would be done in spite of
the lack of consent. This most frequently occurs in connection
with shock treatment. If the patient is a voluntary admission,
however, the patient's consent is obtained and no treatment
would be given without such consent. This policy is based upon
the presumption that the voluntary admission retains com-
petency and that Section 5123.43 does not apply, even though
the language of the statute is sufficiently embracing to cover all
patients and makes no exceptions.
The committed patient loses among other rights-the right
to buy, sell, or hold property, the right to make contracts, to
vote, and to hold office, to marry or divorce. Section 5123.57,
which states that the patient is incompetent, with the exception
of sane epileptics, voluntary patients, and the Medical Certificate
patients under Section 5125.32, refers to "any agreement, or exe-
cute a contract, deed, or other instrument." It also provides that
such instruments can be approved and allowed by the committing
court; but to my knowledge this provision is seldom used.
One of the more highly prized privileges of our modern
culture is that of holding a driver's license. In many instances,
for the patient who is admitted to a receiving hospital for short
term treatment, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is not notified, and
the license is not suspended or revoked. In those cases, if the
patient is discharged in a short time, he is able to resume driving
upon release. When the Bureau is notified, the license is sus-
pended. Inquiries to the hospital concerning civil rights upon
discharge involve the question of drivers' licenses more fre-
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quently than any other item. This is particularly true for the
committed patients released from the long-term hospital, since
they are usually released on a trial visit basis, and thus are not
discharged nor restored to competency. In such instances the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles will frequently accept a statement
from the staff of the hospital, and restore the license. Many
times it is necessary for the patient to have a driver's license in
order to return to work.
Since over 50% of our patients are voluntary admissions,
our policy in relation to the release of information about patients
is similar to that of general hospitals. Most of our inquiries
come from physicians, insurance companies, and other social
agencies. The waiver form signed by the patient is required for
our files before the information is released. In the case of com-
mitted patients, the information which has been filed in the court
is of public record, so that we are not involved in a breach of
privilege. Even so, we give out an absolute minimum of infor-
mation in these cases. When the inquiry comes from another
hospital or professional person, complete information is given.
Occasionally requests for release of information are received
which do not conform to ordinary standards and policy. One of
these, which is encountered in psychiatric hospitals, is the re-
quest by the patient for a copy of his record, purely for his own
information. Our policy here is to individualize these cases, and
our decision is usually based on the symptomatology of the case.
In the paranoid patient (and this group is the one most frequently
encountered) the request is refused, on the ground that such
information will further aggravate the patient's mental condition.
In the case of the committed patient who has not been dis-
charged, one of the problems is that of deciding whether the
signing of the waiver for release of information is valid. The
vast majority of cases do not have guardians appointed, and the
waiver will be signed by a relative. Usually, the decision is
made on the basis of whether any benefit will accrue to the
patient, rather than on the question as to the validity of the
signature.
Finally, I would like to emphasize again that the problems
in regard to the civil rights of patients hospitalized for mental
illness usually arise either at time of admission, or at discharge,
and seldom while the patient is in the hospital.
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